The primary characteristic of a value investor is that he/she loves finding good deals. It might be best to think of them as shoppers who scour through the Sunday newspaper for coupons. This is exactly what they do, but instead of looking through the paper for good deals, they look through the universe of businesses. Value Investors are extremely unwilling to be part of the "herd" mentality, and so may often receive great criticism from market "pundits" for their investment decisions.
A value investor is only willing to buy a company when it's down and out, provided the price is right. At any point in time, there are dozens of companies whose share prices are depressed. There are many reasons for this to happen, such as disappointing quarterly results, unexpected charges, changes in leadership, boring products, etc. A value investor will weigh the drop in price with the news that caused it. If it appears to the investor that the market overreacted (as it almost always does), then he or she might pick up some of the shares at a discount and wait it out.
Wednesday, October 8, 2008
Pros and Cons of value investing
Pros
Reduces long-term risk of losing money by choosing investments which have a built in margin of safety
“Hot” stock tips, hype, and mass hysteria do not affect the decisions a value investor makes
Can produce steady, consistent gains that regularly outperform most benchmarks (e.g. S&P 500, DJIA, etc..
Cons
Value investing is extremely taxing to the average person, as significant analysis must be done prior to investing, and it requires an unusual level of confidence, as investments are made with an infinite time-horizon.
Value Investors must be willing to remain within their circle of competence and invest only in businesses they fully understand. As you can probably see, value investing places great significance on being a savvy businessperson in addition to having an in-depth understanding of securities and markets.
Reduces long-term risk of losing money by choosing investments which have a built in margin of safety
“Hot” stock tips, hype, and mass hysteria do not affect the decisions a value investor makes
Can produce steady, consistent gains that regularly outperform most benchmarks (e.g. S&P 500, DJIA, etc..
Cons
Value investing is extremely taxing to the average person, as significant analysis must be done prior to investing, and it requires an unusual level of confidence, as investments are made with an infinite time-horizon.
Value Investors must be willing to remain within their circle of competence and invest only in businesses they fully understand. As you can probably see, value investing places great significance on being a savvy businessperson in addition to having an in-depth understanding of securities and markets.
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
buffett on GE & bailout
Find Video here................
http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=874482325
http://www.cnbc.com/id/15840232?video=874482325
credit Panic
Fundoo article...................herd behaviour of human!!!!!!!!
Banks have practically stopped lending to one another. Risky assets are so toxic that the 10-year bonds of U.S. financial institutions are currently pricing in almost a 70 percent chance of default, a rate that is an order of magnitude higher than anything that has happened in the past 40 years. Investors are flooding to the exits, and taking whatever prices they can get if the reward is liquid cash.
There is little in recorded history about panics of this magnitude. Perhaps the closest analogue is the Panic of 1907, which economic historians believe was set off by massive losses associated with the San Francisco earthquake a year earlier.
Because this is a once-in-a-century event, policy makers have proceeded in an ad hoc and often confusing manner. Investors and traders haven't been able to guess the U.S. government's next move, and that has exacerbated the stampede.
The rush to search for historical comparisons has inevitably pushed analysts to the Great Depression, which Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke has studied extensively. Others see parallels with the Panic of 1907 or even the Panic of 1837, in which almost a quarter of chartered U.S. banks disappeared.
Searching for lessons from those lost passages of history is a painful stretch. So much has changed.
Moreover, the reliance solely on past financial panics as a guide for optimal policy is myopic. While we have very little experience with such events, we have all too much experience with panics in general. The fact is, we already know how to stop them.
We know the playbook, but we are not following it..
Banks have practically stopped lending to one another. Risky assets are so toxic that the 10-year bonds of U.S. financial institutions are currently pricing in almost a 70 percent chance of default, a rate that is an order of magnitude higher than anything that has happened in the past 40 years. Investors are flooding to the exits, and taking whatever prices they can get if the reward is liquid cash.
There is little in recorded history about panics of this magnitude. Perhaps the closest analogue is the Panic of 1907, which economic historians believe was set off by massive losses associated with the San Francisco earthquake a year earlier.
Because this is a once-in-a-century event, policy makers have proceeded in an ad hoc and often confusing manner. Investors and traders haven't been able to guess the U.S. government's next move, and that has exacerbated the stampede.
The rush to search for historical comparisons has inevitably pushed analysts to the Great Depression, which Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke has studied extensively. Others see parallels with the Panic of 1907 or even the Panic of 1837, in which almost a quarter of chartered U.S. banks disappeared.
Searching for lessons from those lost passages of history is a painful stretch. So much has changed.
Moreover, the reliance solely on past financial panics as a guide for optimal policy is myopic. While we have very little experience with such events, we have all too much experience with panics in general. The fact is, we already know how to stop them.
We know the playbook, but we are not following it..
Is This a Replay of 1929?
The Great Depression that followed the stock market's collapse in October 1929 was a different beast. By the low point in July 1932, stocks had dropped almost 90 percent from their peak. The accompanying devastation—bankruptcies, foreclosures, bread lines—lasted a decade. Even in 1940, unemployment was almost 15 percent. Unlike postwar recessions, the Depression submitted neither to self-correcting market mechanisms nor government policies. Why?
Capitalism's inherent instabilities were blamed—fairly, up to a point. Over borrowing, overinvestment and speculation chronically govern business cycles. Herbert Hoover was also blamed for being too timid—less fairly. In fact, Hoover initially expanded public works to combat the slump. The real culprit was the Federal Reserve. Depression scholarship changed forever in 1963 when economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued, in a highly detailed account, that the Fed had unwittingly transformed an ordinary, if harsh, recession into a calamity by permitting a banking collapse and a disastrous drop in the money supply.
From 1929 to 1933, two fifths of the nation's banks failed; depositor runs were endemic; the money supply (basically, cash plus bank deposits) declined by more than a third. People lost bank accounts; credit for companies and consumers shriveled. The process of economic retrenchment fed on itself and overwhelmed the normal channels of recovery. These mechanisms included surplus inventories being sold so companies could reorder; strong companies expanding as weak competitors disappeared; high debts being repaid so borrowers could resume normal spending
Capitalism's inherent instabilities were blamed—fairly, up to a point. Over borrowing, overinvestment and speculation chronically govern business cycles. Herbert Hoover was also blamed for being too timid—less fairly. In fact, Hoover initially expanded public works to combat the slump. The real culprit was the Federal Reserve. Depression scholarship changed forever in 1963 when economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued, in a highly detailed account, that the Fed had unwittingly transformed an ordinary, if harsh, recession into a calamity by permitting a banking collapse and a disastrous drop in the money supply.
From 1929 to 1933, two fifths of the nation's banks failed; depositor runs were endemic; the money supply (basically, cash plus bank deposits) declined by more than a third. People lost bank accounts; credit for companies and consumers shriveled. The process of economic retrenchment fed on itself and overwhelmed the normal channels of recovery. These mechanisms included surplus inventories being sold so companies could reorder; strong companies expanding as weak competitors disappeared; high debts being repaid so borrowers could resume normal spending
Monday, October 6, 2008
How Good Are Analyst Prediction
Investors feel much more comfortable buying stocks when they believe that others are also piling in. This herd mentality is well documented outside the investing world, but has been discussed many times over within the investment world as well (examples include discussions on the topic from both Ben Graham and Stephen Jarislowsky). To that end, investors often rely on analysts, who are expected to be "experts" in guiding investors on stock selection.But just how good are analysts at predicting the directions of stocks? A decent paper (though dated) is available here which discusses the difficulties in truly evaluating analysts. However, at the very least, if analysts were at all useful, they can at the very least tell the difference between a company that has value and one that is going under. Yet these two very different realities in a company's status continue to baffle these "experts".Consider the latest examples of this: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Before going down (where shareholders lost pretty much everything) two days ago, they each had 13 analysts following them. A full 40% of analysts rated these two companies as either "Strong Buy" or "Buy", compared to just 30% on the sell side. If we can't trust analysts to tell the difference between a company worth something and a company worth nothing, what can they be used for? What do you think many "analysts" said about Bear Sterns right before it went down?In fairness to analysts (and conversely in unfairness to investors), analysts are often confronted with conflicts of interest that may be preventing them from extolling their true opinions of a stock. So analysts might actually be better at stock prediction than we think. However, this makes them no more useful for investors, who should put little stock in what analysts say, and should instead do their own homework, in the same way as they would for any investment outside of the stock market! Why should stocks be treated any differently as an investment than a house, or a private business? You wouldn't let an appraiser pick your house would you?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)